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People versus Machines
The Impact of Minimum Wages on Automatable Jobs
By Grace Lordan, London School of Economics; and  
David Neumark, University of California at Irvine
For decades, economists have studied the effects of the minimum wage on employees in the United States. These studies have largely focused on the employment effects for low-skilled workers—with the principal focus 
on teenagers. Overall, there is some controversy regarding 
whether disemployment effects exist, with some studies 
finding no effects, although with more—and more diverse 
kinds of studies—finding evidence of effects.
We explore the extent to which minimum wages 
induce substitution away from workers whose jobs are 
more easily automated. For instance, employers may 
replace labor with technological innovations—such as 
supermarkets substituting self-service checkout for 
cashiers, and assembly lines in manufacturing plants 
substituting robotic arms for workers. At the same time, 
firms may hire other workers who perform new tasks 
that are complementary with the new technology. For 
example, a firm using more robots may hire individuals to 
service, troubleshoot, and maintain these new machines. 
It seems reasonable to expect that the workers more 
likely to be replaced following minimum wage increases 
are those who are low skilled, earning wages affected 
by increases in the minimum wage, while workers who 
“tend” the machines are higher skilled. This suggests 
that there is a potential for labor reallocation away from 
jobs that are automatable following increases in the 
minimum wage, that low-skilled workers in automat-
able jobs are particularly vulnerable to minimum wage 
increases, and that the net disemployment effects may be 
smaller than the gross effects that workers in automatable 
tasks experience.
We choose to focus on automation because it has been 
one of the major forces threatening low-skilled jobs in the 
United States in recent decades, presumably because of 
both technological advances and reductions in the cost 
of technology that can substitute for low-skilled labor. 
Minimum wages can exacerbate these changes when they 
raise the price of low-skilled labor in automatable jobs for 
which machines can be substituted. 
2Our main aim is to provide a richer understanding of how 
minimum wage policies have been shaping the type of employ-
ment held in the United States, within industries and for 
particular demographic groups. Specifically, we empirically 
assess whether the share of employment that is automatable 
declines in response to minimum wage increases. We focus 
on jobs that tend to be held by low-skilled workers, given that 
these are the jobs for which labor costs increase the most in 
relative terms following a minimum wage increase, which can 
prompt firms to replace people (low-skilled ones, in particu-
lar) with machines. We complement our analyses of how the 
share of employment in automatable jobs responds to mini-
mum wage increases with analyses of employment impacts 
for individual workers, estimating whether the probability 
that low-skilled workers in automatable jobs lose their jobs is 
greater following a minimum wage increase. 
Our analysis is related to concurrent research by 
Daniel Aaronson and Brian J. Phelan, who, for the period 
1999–2009, analyze the susceptibility of low-wage employ-
ment to technological substitution in the short run. They find 
that minimum wage increases lead to job losses for cognitive-
ly routine jobs, but not manually routine or nonroutine jobs. 
Their study provides some evidence that firms may automate 
routine jobs in response to a minimum wage increase, reduc-
ing employment opportunities for workers in routine jobs. 
We add value beyond this analysis in a number of ways. 
First, whereas Aaronson and Phelan are concerned with an 
average individual’s job loss, we focus on quantifying how 
shares in the employment of automatable tasks change fol-
lowing a minimum wage change, to provide more evidence 
on how the task composition of the workforce is affected. 
Second, we expect that automation is a viable and likely 
substitute for certain types of low-skilled jobs, and therefore 
also certain types of low-skilled labor, implying that average 
effects may mask significant heterogeneity. Therefore, our 
second contribution is to provide a comprehensive picture of 
labor-market adjustments across industries and a variety of 
demographic groups, which can uncover these important dif-
ferential responses. This may be of particular interest within 
the broader minimum wage literature. While that literature 
has largely focused on teenagers (and more recently restau-
rant workers), we take a broader perspective, expanding the 
analysis to subgroups of workers not usually considered in 
the minimum wage literature, who may be adversely affect-
ed by minimum wages because they tend to be employed in 
automatable jobs.  
Third, for those who lose their jobs to automation fol-
lowing a minimum wage increase, we expect that the risk 
of not being able to find a similar job is greater for some 
groups as compared to others, and that an inability to do 
so has longer-term adverse consequences for earnings 
(and reemployment). Hence, we also analyze the effects of 
minimum wage increases on whether particular types of 
low-skilled individuals working in automatable jobs are more 
or less likely to stay employed, or stay employed in the same 
occupation, following a minimum wage increase.
Together, our analyses provide the first evidence on how 
the shares of automatable jobs change following a minimum 
wage increase, and on the effects of minimum wages on 
groups that are very often ignored in the minimum wage lit-
erature, such as effects on older, less-skilled workers who are 
in jobs where it is easier to replace people with machines. 
Our work is timely given that many U.S. states have 
continued to regularly raise their minimum wages, and a large 
number of additional states have newly implemented mini-
mum wage laws (all higher than the federal minimum wage), 
with a number of states now indexing their minimum wages. 
As of January 7, 2017, 30 states (including the District of 
Columbia) had a minimum wage higher than the federal min-
imum wage of $7.25, ranging as high as $11.00 in Washington 
State, and $11.50 in the District of Columbia. Moreover, 
many U.S. cities have implemented minimum wages, with 
the minimum wage in Seattle (and nearby Sea-Tac) reaching 
$15. Policy debate regarding these increases frequently ref-
erences the literature on disemployment effects discussed 
above (a literature from which advocates on either side can 
pick evidence to support their views). But this literature 
largely focuses on teenagers, for whom employment effects 
are either irrelevant, or at best very tangentially related, to 
the more important policy question of whether higher mini-
mum wages help low-income families. If employment chang-
es in response to higher minimum wages mask larger gross 
effects for subgroups of low-skilled workers in automatable 
tasks—and in particular subgroups ignored in the existing 
minimum wage literature—then the reliance of policymakers 
on evidence for teenagers may be ignoring potentially adverse 
effects for older workers more likely to be major contributors 
to their families’ incomes. Our empirical analysis draws on 
Current Population Survey data from 1980–2015. 
Overall, we find that increasing the minimum wage 
decreases significantly the share of automatable employment 
held by low-skilled workers. Our estimates suggest that an 
increase of the minimum wage by $1 (based on 2015 dollars) 
decreases the share of low-skilled automatable jobs by 0.43 
percentage point. However, these average effects mask sig-
nificant heterogeneity by industry and by demographic group. 
3In particular, minimum wage increases have large effects on 
the share of automatable employment in manufacturing, 
where we estimate that a $1 increase in the minimum wage 
decreases the share of automatable employment among low-
skilled workers by 0.99 percentage point. Within manufactur-
ing, the share of older workers in automatable employment 
declines most sharply, and the share of workers in automat-
able employment also declines sharply for women and blacks. 
Our analysis at the individual level draws many similar 
conclusions. We find that a significant number of individuals 
who were previously in automatable employment are unem-
ployed in the period following a minimum wage increase. 
These effects are among the largest for individuals employed 
in the manufacturing industry and are larger for the oldest 
and youngest workers, for females, and for blacks. Overall, 
our analysis points to important heterogeneity in the employ-
ment effects of minimum wages, and highlights potentially 
adverse consequences of higher minimum wages for groups 
of workers that have not typically been considered in the 
extensive research literature on the employment effects of 
minimum wages. That is, the main message from our work is 
that groups often ignored in the minimum wage literature are 
in fact quite vulnerable to employment changes and job loss 
because of automation following a minimum wage increase.
In the future many more occupations that employ low-
skilled workers are on track to be automated. These include, 
for example, taxi drivers, cashiers, and bricklayers. Therefore, 
it is important to acknowledge that minimum wage increases 
can give incentives for firms to adopt new technologies that 
replace workers earlier. While these adoptions undoubtedly 
lead to some new jobs, there are workers who do not have the 
skills to do the new tasks who will be displaced. Our analysis 
has identified workers whose vulnerability to being replaced 
by machines has been amplified by minimum wage increases. 
Such effects may spread to more workers in the future.
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